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3 
A case for interest rate smoothing 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 25/2007 
Mikael Bask 




The aim of this paper is to determine whether it would be desirable from the 
perspective of macroeconomic balance for central banks to take account of 
nominal exchange rate movements when framing monetary policy. The theoretical 
framework is a small, open DSGE economy that is closed by a Taylor rule for the 
monetary authority, and a determinate REE that is least-squares learnable is 
defined as a desirable outcome in the economy. When the policy rule contains 
contemporaneous data on the output gap and the CPI inflation rate, the monetary 
authority does not have to consider the exchange rate as long as there is sufficient 
inertia in policy-making. In fact, due to a parity condition on the international 
asset market, interest-rate smoothing and a response to changes in the nominal 
exchange rate are perfectly intersubstitutable in monetary policy. In other words, 
we give a rationale for the monetary authority to focus on the change in the 
nominal interest rate rather than its level in policy-making. Thus, we have a case 
for interest-rate smoothing. 
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4 
Korkosäännöt ja rahapolitiikan jatkuvuus 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 25/2007 
Mikael Bask 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, olisiko kokonaistaloudellisen tasapainon kannalta 
toivottavaa, että keskuspankki ottaisi rahapoliittisia päätöksiä tehdessään huo-
mioon nimellisten valuuttakurssien vaihteluihin sisältyvän informaation. Työn 
teoreettisissa tarkasteluissa käytetään modernissa rahapolitiikan analyysissa 
yleistä pienen avotalouden dynaamista makromallia, jossa keskuspankki toteuttaa 
rahapolitiikkaa ohjailemalla korkoja. Korko-ohjailun tehokkuutta ja onnistumista 
arvioidaan sen mukaan, onko talouden kehitys sopusoinnussa hyvin määritellyn 
rationaalisten odotusten tasapainon kanssa. Tämän tasapainon ominaisuudet 
taloudenpitäjät oppivat hyödyntämällä estimoituja tilastollisia malleja ennusteiden 
laatimiseksi. Jos korkopäätökset perustuvat tuotantokuilua ja inflaatiota koskeviin 
julkaistuihin tilastotietoihin, keskuspankin ei analyysin tulosten mukaan tarvitse 
erikseen ottaa huomioon valuuttakurssin muutoksia korkopäätöksiä tehdessään, 
mikäli keskuspankilla on riittävän voimakas tarve tasata korkojen vaihteluita eli 
mikäli halu turvata harjoitetun rahapolitiikan jatkuvuus on riittävän voimakas. 
Täysin vapaiden pääomaliikkeiden oloissa kotimaiset ja ulkomaiset sijoitus-
kohteet ovat mallissa itse asiassa täydellisiä substituutteja, joten korko-
vaihteluiden tasaaminen ja reagointi nimellisen valuuttakurssin muutoksiin 
korvaavat rahapolitiikan kannalta toisensa täydellisesti. Tämän tuloksen avulla 
voidaan näin ollen perustella keskuspankin halua tasoittaa korkojen vaihteluita. 
 
Avainsanat: määrittyneisyys, E-stabiilius, ulkomaanvaluutta, rahapolitiikan jatku-
vuus, korkosääntö 
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It is argued in Taylor (2001) that it is not necessary to react to movements in
exchange rates in monetary policy to havead e s i r a b l eo u t c o m ei nt h ee c o n o m y .
Taylor’s (2001) argument is that the indirect eﬀects that exchange rates have
on monetary policy, via its eﬀects on output and the inﬂation rate, are to
prefer since it results in fewer and less erratic changes in the nominal interest
rate.
In this paper, we re-examine the question whether one should respond
to nominal exchange rate movements in policy-making by embedding two
speciﬁcations of an interest rate rule into a small open economy, where
we include an exchange rate term in the policy-rules. In the ﬁrst rule,
contemporaneous data on the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate and the
nominal exchange rate change are included, whereas, in the second rule,
forward expectations of the same variables are included in the rule.
We also augment the policy-rules with the interest rate in the previous time
period to allow for inertia in monetary policy. This means that we are able
to answer the following question: should the monetary authority care about
the interest rate level or the change i nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t et oh a v ead e s i r a b l e
outcome in the economy? Recall that inertia in policy-making has sometimes
been the source of criticism in the ﬁnancial press of central banking behavior
since the adjustments of the interest rate have been claimed to be too slow.
Thus, the posed question is relevant to answer.
What is then a desirable outcome in the economy? We focus on two
things. First, we search for the regions in an interest rate rule’s parameter
space that give rise to a unique and stable rational expectations equilibrium
(REE). Second, such a REE should also be learnable in least squares sense,
and this is because rational expectation is a rather strong assumption since
it assumes that agents often have an outstanding capacity when it comes to
deriving equilibrium outcomes of the variables in a model. We make use of
the E-stability concept when doing the learnability analysis (see Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001, for an introduction to this literature).
There are two papers that are closely related to this paper. The ﬁrst is
Llosa and Tuesta (2007) who examine the inclusion of an exchange rate term
in the interest rate rule but neglects from inertia in monetary policy, and the
second is Bullard and Mitra (2007) who allow for inertia in policy-making but
for a closed economy.1 It goes without saying that we are able to replicate
their ﬁndings. But, more importantly, it turns out that our paper is able to ﬁll
the gap between Bullard and Mitra (2007) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) with
some interesting ﬁndings.
1 The inclusion of an exchange rate term in the interest rate rule in actual policy-making
is examined in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and they ﬁnd that the Bank of Canada and the
Bank of England react to movements in nominal exchange rates, whereas this is not the case
for the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Turning to interest
rate inertia in monetary policy, this is a well-documented feature of central banking behavior
in developed countries (see Bullard and Mitra, 2007). For example, Rudebusch (1995) ﬁnds
that the Federal Reserve’s policy can be characterized by interest rate smoothing.
7Three ﬁndings should be emphasized. First, it is more likely to have a
desirable outcome in the economy when the central bank cares about the
change i nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er a t h e rt h a ni t slevel. Second, the speciﬁcation
o ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l et h a tc o n t a i n sc o n t e m p o r a n e o u sd a t ao ft h ev a r i a b l e si s
more likely to deliver a desirable outcome in the economy than the speciﬁcation
with forward expectations of the same variables.
Third, it is not necessary to respond to the exchange rate in monetary policy
to achieve a determinate REE that is least squares learnable. The reason is
that interest rate inertia is a perfect substitute to the nominal exchange rate
change response (when contemporaneous data are used in the policy-rule).
Thus, it is not because it would result in fewer and less erratic changes in the
interest rate nor that a reaction to the output gap or the CPI inﬂation rate
would be a perfect substitute in policy-making.
Instead, the intuition to this result is that a parity condition at the
international asset market (namely, uncovered interest rate parity), ties the
current interest rate and the expected exchange rate change together. Further,
since this parity condition is assumed to hold in every time period, it also holds
in the previous time period, meaning that the parity condition also ties the
lagged interest rate and the current exchange rate change together.2
Thus, we have the following link between Bullard and Mitra (2007),
Llosa and Tuesta (2007) and our paper: Llosa and Tuesta (2007) show
that policy-rules that include an exchange rate term can help alleviate the
indeterminacy problem, but at the cost of greater volatility in the economy
(see also Taylor, 2001). We therefore show that the monetary authority can
shift focus from an exchange rate response in monetary policy to interest rate
smoothing.
Consequently, interest rate smoothing should help alleviate the
indeterminacy problem. This is also the main ﬁnding in Bullard and Mitra
(2007) but for a closed economy, meaning that we broaden their ﬁnding. Thus,
we give a rationale for the monetary authority to focus on the change in the
interest rate rather than its level to have a desirable outcome in the economy.
This is interesting from the point of view of practical policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The model economy is
outlined in Section 2, whereas determinacy and E-stability results are presented
in Section 3 for both interest rate rules in policy-making. Section 4 concludes
the paper with a discussion of our main ﬁnding.
2 Note that the foreign interest rate in the parity condition is exogenous since we are
dealing with a small economy, and that shocks to expectations also are exogenous, meaning
that the conditions for a desirable outcome in the economy are not aﬀected by changes in
these constants. Of course, if one would like to estimate the model economy from data and
then compute impulse-response functions for key variables, one must estimate these shocks
to expectations.
82A s m a l l o p e n e c o n o m y
The baseline model is outlined in Section 2.1, which is a model for a small
open economy. Thereafter, in Section 2.2, we present two speciﬁcations of
an interest rate rule for monetary policy that are embedded into the baseline
m o d e li nS e c t i o n3 .
2.1 Baseline model
A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities is presented in Galí and Monacelli (2005)
for a small open economy.3 After extensive derivations, their model can be











where x is the output gap, r is the nominal interest rate, πH is the domestic
inﬂation rate, rr is the natural rate of interest, and the superscript e denotes
rational expectation of the variable in focus, where the dating of expectations
is time period t. All variables are in natural logarithms, except the interest
rates.
Unfortunately, (2.1) is not in an appropriate form since there is no exchange
rate term in the equations. It is, however, possible to use the following
equations that are derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005) to rewrite (2.1) into a
suitable form
½
πt = πH,t + δ∆st
st = et + p∗
t − pH,t
(2.2)
where π is the CPI inﬂation rate, s is the terms of trade, e is the nominal
exchange rate that is the domestic price of the foreign currency, p∗ is the
index of foreign goods prices, pH is the index of domestic goods prices, and
the asterisk denotes a foreign quantity. For interpretations of the structural
parameters, we refer to Galí and Monacelli (2005).
If we rewrite the equations in (2.1) with help of those in (2.2), we get the






























The third equation in the model, which also is derived in Galí and Monacelli






To complete the model in (2.3)—(2.4), we will augment it with an interest rate
rule for the monetary authority.
3 Llosa and Tuesta (2007) also use the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model, and Bullard and
Mitra (2007) use a closed economy version of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model.
92.2 Interest rate rules examined
The monetary authority is using a Taylor (instrument) rule when setting the
nominal interest rate, where two speciﬁcations of the rule are examined: (i)
contemporaneous data in the rule
rt = ζrrt−1 + ζxxt + ζππt + ζe∆et (2.5)
and (ii) forward expectations in the rule







We have also included the interest rate in the previous time period in the rules
to allow for inertia in policy-making. An interesting special case of inertia that
we will focus on is ζr =1 .T h i si sb e c a u s et h i sa l l o w su st oa n s w e rar e l e v a n t
question in practical policy: should the monetary authority care about the
interest rate level or the change i nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t et oh a v ead e s i r a b l eo u t c o m e
in the economy?
One could also think of a lagged data speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule.
However, since we assume time-t dating of expectations, we neglect from such
a speciﬁcation in the analysis. To pose a rhetorical question: is it reasonable
to believe that the monetary authority is reacting to old information when
setting the interest rate?
Finally, the vigilant reader might object that Taylor (2001) is referring to
the real exchange rate in his discussion, whereas we have included the nominal
exchange rate in the interest rate rules. It is, however, an easy exercise to
transform the rules in (2.5)—(2.6) to rules that are functions of the real exchange
rate, q, via the following identity: ∆qt ≡ ∆et + π∗
t − πt.
3 Properties of the model economy
In Section 3.1, the speciﬁcation of the policy-rule that contains
contemporaneous data on the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate and the
nominal exchange rate change is embedded into the baseline model and then
analyzed. Speciﬁcally, conditions for a determinate REE that is least squares
learnable are derived. In Section 3.2, the speciﬁcation of the rule that contains
forward expectations of the same variables is embedded into the baseline model
and then analyzed.
3.1 Contemporaneous data in the interest rate rule
After substituting the Taylor rule in (2.5) into the baseline model in (2.3)—(2.4),
the complete model in matrix form is
Γ · yt = Θ · y
e
t+1 + Λ · yt−1 (3.1)
w h e r et h es t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m yi s
yt =[ xt,πt,∆et,r t]
0 (3.2)
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We have neglected from a constant in (3.1) since it does not aﬀect our ﬁndings
when it comes to conditions for a desirable outcome in the economy.
To be able to determine whether the complete model has a determinate
REE, a ﬁrst step is to rewrite the model into ﬁrst-order form, and then to
compare the number of predetermined variables with the number of eigenvalues
of a certain matrix that are outside the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn,
1980). Speciﬁcally, we make use of the following variable vector when rewriting





















because the complete model in matrix form is now
Γd · yd,t = Θd · y
e
d,t+1 (3.9)
Unfortunately, the matrix Γd (and Θd) is singular, meaning that the matrix
Γ
−1
d ·Θd (and Θ
−1
d ·Γd), which is the relevant matrix when determining whether
t h ec o m p l e t em o d e lh a sad e t e r m i n a t eR E E ,d o e sn o te x i s t .O n ew a yt os o l v e
this problem is by substituting out the current and expected exchange rate
changes from the equations. That is, to use the UIP condition in (2.4) to
substitute out ∆ee
t+1, and to use the same equation l a g g e do n et i m ep e r i o dt o





t = ∆et +  t (3.10)
11where the dating of expectations is time period t − 1,a n d  is the realized
error in the expectation formation, which is a constant that does not aﬀect our
ﬁndings when it comes to conditions for a desirable outcome in the economy.
Putting it diﬀerently,   is an exogenous shock to expectations.
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(3.13)
One thing that we immediately observe is that interest rate inertia and
a reaction to the nominal exchange rate change are perfect substitutes in
monetary policy, and this is because the parameters ζr and ζe in the Taylor
rule in (2.5) appear at the same place in the matrix Γd and also with the same
coeﬃcient (−1). The intuition to this ﬁnding, which is a strong result, is that
the UIP condition in (3.10) ties the lagged interest rate and the exchange rate
change together.
Thus, our ﬁrst ﬁnding is this:
Finding 1 When contemporaneous data are used in the policy-rule, interest
rate inertia and a reaction to the exchange rate change are perfect substitutes
in policy-making.
When deriving conditions for a determinate REE, it is not always
self-evident which variables in a model that are predetermined. But by looking
at the entries in the relevant matrix
Γ
−1











we can conclude that r in (3.11) is predetermined. For this reason, exactly
one eigenvalue of the matrix Γ
−1
d · Θd must be outside the unit circle to have
a determinate REE. In other words, if more than one eigenvalue are outside
the unit circle, we have an indeterminate REE, and if no eigenvalue is outside
the unit circle, there is no stable REE in the economy.
12Turning to the learnability analysis, to have a REE that is E-stable and
therefore least squares learnable, the parameter values in the agents’ perceived
law of motion (PLM) of the economy have to converge to the economy’s actual
law of motion (ALM). Further, it is shown in McCallum (2007) that for a broad
class of linear rational expectations models, which includes the model in (3.1),
a determinate REE is E-stable when the dating of expectations is time period
t. Consequently, all determinacy regions found below are also regions for a
least squares learnable REE.
T h i sm e a n st h a tw eh a v eo u rs e c o n dﬁnding:
Finding 2 When contemporaneous data are used in the policy-rule, and a
main objective in monetary policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable,
interest rate inertia and a reaction to the exchange rate change are perfect
substitutes in policy-making.
Thus, we have a case for interest rate smoothing since it is not necessary
to respond to the exchange rate to achieve a determinate REE that is least
squares learnable. The intuition to this result is that a parity condition at the
international asset market ties the lagged interest rate and the exchange rate
change together.
How strong must interest rate smoothing be to have a desirable outcome in
the economy? Are there any restrictions on the other parameters in the Taylor
rule in (2.5)?
Deriving analytical conditions for determinacy and E-stability is not
meaningful since these expressions would be too large and cumbersome to
interpret. Instead, we adopt the same strategy as other papers within this
research area and illustrate our ﬁndings graphically using calibrated values of
the structural parameters.4 To be more precise, the following parameter values
are used in the analysis:5
½
α = 1
0.157 β =0 .99 γ =0 .024
δ =0 .4 ζr =0 , 1 ζx =0 .5 (3.15)
See Woodford (1999) for the values of α, β and γ.M o r e o v e r , δ ∈ [0,1] is
the economy’s openness index since it is the share of consumption allocated
to imported goods. When δ =0 .4, this index approximates the import/GDP
r a t i oi na no p e ne c o n o m ys u c ha sC a n a d a . 6
Turning to the parameters in the interest rate rule, we set the output
gap reaction to ζx =0 .5 since this value is close to what typically is found
in data (see Clarida et al, 2000). When it comes to the importance of the
lagged interest rate in policy-making, we examine two cases: (i) the monetary
authority cares about the interest rate level (no inertia); and (ii) the monetary
authority cares about the change in the interest rate (inertia).
4 MATLAB routines for this purpose are available on request from the author.
5 Bullard and Mitra (2002)—(2007) use the same calibration of the structural parameters
as we do.
6 This value of δ is also used in Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007).
13The central bank cares about the interest rate level7
In Figure 1, there is no inertia in policy-making, meaning that the monetary
authority is focusing on the interest rate level in monetary policy.

















































Region for a determinate REE that is least squares learnable (see light area) and
region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)
Figure 1. C o n t e m p o r a n e o u sd a t aa r eu s e di nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ea n di ti s
the interest rate level that matters in policy-making.
Two things in the ﬁgure can be noted. First, if the inﬂation rate response in
t h eT a y l o rr u l ei sl a r g ee n o u g h ,t h em o n e t a r ya u t h o r i t yd o e sn o th a v et ot h i n k
about the exchange rate to achieve a determinate REE that is least squares
learnable. Second, if the inﬂation rate response in the rule is at the lower
bound to achieve the same outcome, there is a one-to-one trade-oﬀ between
reactions to the inﬂation rate and the exchange rate change.
We also have the following ﬁndings (that are not shown graphically8): (i)
the determinacy-learnability region is not visibly aﬀected by the openness
index, which is a somewhat surprising result; and (ii) a larger (smaller)
o u t p u tg a pr e a c t i o ni nt h eT a y l o rr u l es h i f t st h el o w e rb o u n do ft h e
determinacy-learnability region slightly downwards (upwards).
7 See Bullard and Mitra (2002), especially Figure 1, since our results limit their results
when δ → 0. See also Llosa and Tuesta (2007), especially Figure 2, but be aware that they
use a somewhat diﬀerent calibration of the structural parameters than we do.
8 These and other results discussed in the paper, but not shown graphically, are available
on request from the author in the form of graphs.
14We summarize the results as follows:
Finding 3 When the interest rate level matters in policy-making,
contemporaneous data are used in the policy-rule, and a main objective in
monetary policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable, there is no need
to consider the exchange rate change in policy-making, if the inﬂation rate
reaction is large enough.
To make the needed inﬂation rate reaction in the interest rate rule more
precise, if the monetary authority doe sn o tc a r ea b o u tt h ee x c h a n g er a t ei n
policy-making, it is suﬃcient that the Taylor principle is satisﬁed to achieve a
determinate REE that is least squares learnable. The Taylor principle says that
the monetary authority can stabilize the economy by increasing (decreasing)
the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one in response to a higher (lower)
inﬂation rate, meaning that the real interest rate also is increasing (decreasing).
The central bank cares about the change in the interest rate9
In Figure 2, there is inertia in policy-making.

















































Region for a determinate REE that is least squares learnable (see light area) and
region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)
Figure 2. C o n t e m p o r a n e o u sd a t aa r eu s e di nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ea n di ti s
the change in the interest rate that matters in policy-making.
9 Even though Bullard and Mitra (2007) allow for inertia in policy-making, they do not
consider a contemporaneous data speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule.
15I nf a c t ,t h ei n e r t i ai ss os t r o n g( ζr =1 ) that the monetary authority shifts
focus from the interest rate level to the interest rate change in the Taylor rule
∆rt ≡ rt − rt−1 = ζxxt + ζππt + ζe∆et (3.16)
It turns out that the results mentioned above still hold, but there is one
important exception. Due to inertia in monetary policy, the lower bound
of the determinacy-learnability region shifts downwards. In fact, when inertia
is ζr =1 , the shift is so large that the monetary authority does not have to
think about the inﬂation rate nor the exchange rate to achieve a determinate
REE that is least squares learnable. This is a strong result.
We can also formulate this ﬁnding as follows:
Finding 4 When the change in the interest rate matters in policy-making,
contemporaneous data are used in the policy-rule, and a main objective in
monetary policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable, it is enough with
a modest output gap reaction in policy-making.
In fact, the output gap reaction in policy-making can be so modest that it is
almost negligible.
Let us now examine the properties of the model economy when the
monetary authority is using the Taylor rule in (2.6) in monetary policy. That
is, forward expectations of the output gap, the CPI inﬂation rate and the
exchange rate change replace contemporaneous data of the same variables.
3.2 Forward expectations in the interest rate rule
Due to the fact that the analysis of the model economy in this section is similar
to the analysis in Section 3.1, it is not necessary to repeat every step. We are
therefore more concise here.
First, the complete model in matrix form is again (3.1)—(3.5), but with
the exception that the elements in the last row in each matrix are replaced
with the appropriate elements as described by the Taylor rule in (2.6). After
rewriting the model into ﬁrst-order form, it is also easily veriﬁed that we again
have problems with singular matrices when trying to derive conditions for a
desirable outcome in the economy.
For this reason, we substitute out the current and expected exchange rate
changes from the equations with help of the UIP conditions in (2.4) and (3.10).
This means that when the Taylor rule in (2.6) is used in policy-making, the
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Second, the relevant matrix for the determinacy and E-stability results, Γ
−1
d ·
Θd, has the same form as in (3.14), meaning that r in (3.11) is predetermined
even in this case. This means that we have the same eigenvalue-conditions
as above to have a determinate REE that is least squares learnable, an
indeterminate REE and no stable REE in the economy.
Turning to the ﬁndings (and having Findings 1 and 2 above in mind),
interest rate inertia and a reaction to the expected exchange rate change are
not perfect substitutes in monetary policy, and the reason is that the UIP
conditions in (2.4) and (3.10) are not able to tie the lagged interest rate and
the expected exchange rate change together. This result is also visible in the
matrix Γd since the parameters ζr and ζe in the Taylor rule in (2.6) do not
appear at the same place in the matrix.
T h i sm e a n st h a tw eh a v eo u rﬁfth ﬁnding:
Finding 5 When forward expectations are used in the policy-rule, and a main
objective in monetary policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable,
interest rate inertia and a reaction to the expected exchange rate change are
not perfect substitutes in policy-making.
We examine two cases when it comes to the importance of the lagged interest
rate in policy-making: (i) the monetary authority cares about the interest rate
level (no inertia); and (ii) the monetary authority cares about the change in
the interest rate (inertia). As we also did in Section 3.1, we illustrate our
ﬁndings graphically using the parameter values in (3.15).
17The central bank cares about the interest rate level10
In Figure 3, there is no inertia in policy-making.

















































Region for a determinate REE that is least squares learnable (see light area) and
region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)
Figure 3. Forward expectations are used in the interest rate rule and it is the
interest rate level that matters in policy-making.
Two things in the ﬁgure can be noted. First, since we assume that ζx =0 .5 in
the policy-rule, the monetary authority must respond to the expected exchange
rate to achieve a determinate REE that is least squares learnable, and that
this is irrespective of the strength in the expected inﬂation rate response. To
be more precise, the central bank should decrease (increase) the interest rate
when the exchange rate is expected to depreciate (appreciate) since, otherwise,
we would have a multiplicity of REE in the economy. However, if there would
not be any expected output response in the rule (ζx =0 ), an expected inﬂation
rate response that is not too weak or too strong would secure a unique and
learnable REE (that is not shown graphically).
Second, if the expected inﬂation rate response in the policy-rule is at
the lower bound to achieve a desirable outcome in the economy, there is
a one-to-one trade-oﬀ between reactions to the expected inﬂation rate and
10 See Bullard and Mitra (2002), especially Figure 3, since our results limit their results
when δ → 0. See also Llosa and Tuesta (2007), especially Figure 6, but be aware that they
use a somewhat diﬀerent calibration of the structural parameters than we do.
18the expected exchange rate change. Recall that a similar result holds when
the monetary authority responds to contemporaneous data of the variables as
described by the Taylor rule in (2.5).
Also recall that when the policy-rule in (2.5) is used in monetary policy,
the determinacy-learnability region is not visibly aﬀected by the openness
index. This is no longer true when the monetary authority is using the rule in
(2.6). In the latter case, a less (more) open economy increases (decreases) the
determinacy-learnability region (that is not shown graphically).
Let us summarize the aforementioned results as follows:
Finding 6 When the interest rate level matters in policy-making, forward
expectations are used in the policy-rule, and a main objective in monetary
policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable, one must consider the
expected exchange rate change in policy-making, if there is an expected output
reaction.
The central bank cares about the change in the interest rate11
In Figure 4, there is inertia in policy-making.

















































Region for a determinate REE that is least squares learnable (see light area) and
region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)
Figure 4. Forward expectations are used in the interest rate rule and it is the
change in the interest rate that matters in policy-making.
11 See Bullard and Mitra (2007), especially Figure 2.
19A shift in focus from the interest rate level to the interest rate change has the
eﬀect that the determinacy-learnability region increases in size. In fact, this
increase is so large that it is no longer necessary for the monetary authority to
respond to the expected exchange rate to achieve a determinate REE that is
l e a s ts q u a r e sl e a r n a b l e .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ee x p e c t e di n ﬂation rate response
cannot be too strong to have a desirable outcome in the economy.
We can formulate this ﬁnding as follows:
Finding 7 When the change in the interest rate matters in policy-making,
forward expectations are used in the policy-rule, and a main objective in
monetary policy is to achieve a unique REE that is learnable, there is no need
to consider the expected exchange rate change in policy-making, if the expected
inﬂation rate reaction is small enough.
4 Discussion
For a small open economy, it is natural to ask whether one should augment the
Taylor rule with an exchange rate term to achieve a desirable outcome in the
economy such as a determinate REE that is least squares learnable. Taylor’s
(2001) answer to this question is no, and his argument is that the indirect
eﬀects that exchange rates have on monetary policy, via its eﬀects on output
and the inﬂation rate, are to prefer since it results in fewer and less erratic
changes in the nominal interest rate.
We agree with Taylor (2001) that there is no need to include an exchange
rate term in the interest rate rule, even though our argument is somewhat
diﬀerent. If the policy-rule contains contemporaneous data on the output gap
and the CPI inﬂation rate, the monetary authority does not have to care about
the exchange rate as long as there is enough with inertia in policy-making. To
be more precise, due to a parity condition at the international asset market,
interest rate smoothing and a response to the nominal exchange rate change
are perfect substitutes in monetary policy.
Bullard and Mitra (2007) show the merits of interest rate smoothing in
policy-making but for a closed economy, and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) examine
t h ei n c l u s i o no fa ne x c h a n g er a t et e r mi nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l eb u tn e g l e c t s
from inertia. However, even though the inclusion of such a term helps alleviate
the indeterminacy problem, the cost is greater volatility in the economy (see
also Taylor, 2001). We therefore show that the central bank can shift focus
from an exchange rate response in monetary policy to interest rate smoothing.
Thus, we are able to ﬁll the gap between Bullard and Mitra (2007) and
Llosa and Tuesta (2007) with an important ﬁnding since we give a rationale
for the monetary authority to focus on the change in the interest rate rather
than its level to have a desirable outcome in the economy. This is interesting
from the point of view of practical policy, and be aware that this ﬁnding does
not rely on any speciﬁc calibration of the structural parameters in the model
economy.
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∗





· (πt − δ(∆et + π
∗
t)) + ε5,t (A1.6)
where the ε:s are the realized errors in the expectations formations. Finally,
substitute (A1.3) into the ﬁrst equation in (2.1), substitute (A1.3) and (A1.6)
into the second equation in (2.1), and (2.3) is derived.
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